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Safeguarding Atoms-For-Peace:
U. K. Bilateral Agreements
With Other Nations*
STEPHEN GOROVE*

The dawn of the atomic age in the mid-twentieth century has
brought with it many challenges and unique responsibilities. One
of the most difficult among them has been the prevention of a nuclear holocaust in a world arena dotted with suspicion, jealousy
and even outright hostility.
Faced with excessive delays if not insuperable obstacles in finding a generally acceptable formula for atomic arms control and
recognizing the close interrelationship between the civil and military applications of nuclear energy, the leading nuclear powers
of the West wished to insure at least that their atomic assistance intended for the peaceful pursuits of less developed nations would
not be diverted to wartime purposes and would not result in a proliferation of nuclear arms. For the achievement of these objectives,
the channeling and safeguarding of civilian nuclear assistance
through an international agency seemed in many ways a preferable
alternative to direct help and supervision under a bilateral agreement between the supplying and the receiving nations. However,
the long drawn-out and for many years uncertain birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)1 prompted the United
Kingdom to initiate its bilateral procedures, 2 just as it spurred
* This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by the American Society of International Law involving international
procedures and techniques developed to control the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.
**rProfessor of Law, University of Mississippi
School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the generous support and counsel obtained from the
Society and its Advisory Group. For the text of the article, including the
views advanced therein, the responsibility rests with the author.
I For discussion of the establishment of the IAEA, see Bechhofer & Stein,
Atoms for Peace, 55 Mica. L. REv. 747 (1957); Gorove, Humanizing the
Atom: Establishment of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.L.F.
245 (1957).
2The first atomic energy legislation in the United Kingdom Parliament
was the Atomic Energy Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 80, under which the
Minister of Supply was given the responsibility of promoting and controlling
the development of atomic energy. Following the first United Kingdom test
of an atomic weapon in October, 1952, a study was made of existing arrangements by the Waverley Committee. The Committee's recommendations
became the basis of the Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2,
c. 32, 2(a), which set up the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
with powers to produce, use and dispose of atomic energy and to carry out
research into any matters connected therewith.
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the United States and Canada to inaugurate theirs.' Now that the
IAEA not only has come into being but has started with increasing
fervor to discharge its safeguarding responsibilities, it seems appropriate to review and to evaluate the United Kingdom bilateral
control system which, like its United States and Canadian counterparts, has been a fore-runner of the international machinery.
The stipulations which have been incorporated in the United
Kingdom bilateral accords with other nations for the purposes of
safeguarding atoms-for-peace are in more than one way reminiscent
of those found in like agreements concluded by the United States
and Canada, respectively.4 Despite the similarities which were the
result of coordinated policy among the three nations, the United

Kingdom bilaterals constitute a distinct group, the provisions of
which appropriately may be reviewed in terms of the purposes,

procedures, and transfer of the safeguards system.5
PuRPOSES OF THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

The primary purpose of the control system is to prevent the

diversion of certain designated materials from peaceful to military uses. The objective of "nondiversion" is expressed in various
more or less general terms such as a guarantee to use materials
solely for the promotion and development of the peaceful pursuits
of atomic energy or a pledge not to use them for atomic weapons
or for any other military purpose.' While, generally, the United
' For accounts of the bilateral control systems instituted by the United

States and Canada, respectively, see Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace:
U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1966); Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace Under Canadian Bilateral
Agreements with Other Nations 42 DE~vER L. CENTR J. 41 (1965); Seaborg,
Existing Arrangements for International Control of Warlike Material-5: The
United States Program of Bilateral Safeguards, 2 DismAnummNT & Amis
CONTROL 442 (Autumn 1964).
4 A brief comparison and evaluation of the various control procedures
may be found in Corove, International Security Controls: From the Atom to
Cosmnic Space, PRoc. SIXH COLLOQUIuM OF

THE

LAW

OF

OUTER

SPACE

1

(Paris 1963); Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-For-Peace: Some Facts and
Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, in 1965 Washington World Conference
on World Peace Through Law 1 (mimeo.).
5 For purpose of sinplication, the agreements cited in the footnotes will
be identified by name of the country with which the United Kingdom concluded the accord (e.g. Areement with Bel ium) and by the date on which
the agreement was signed. Accords modifying earlier agreements will be
noted only if relevant to the provision under discussion.
"See, for instance, Agreements with: Germany, July 31, 1956, 252
U.N.T.S. 94, art. VII; Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313 U.N.T.S. 110, art. V;
Sweden, Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. VI. It may be noted that
under art. IX.B of the agreement of June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2709
with the United States, both the United Kingdom and the United States
guarantee nondiversion.
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Kingdom does not guarantee nondiversion, where there is an excess of special nuclear material that the recipient government does
not wish to dispose of, and the United Kingdom wishes to purchase
under its priority right, such materials may be used for peaceful
purposes only.'
The scope of control covers materials and equipment obtained
pursuant to the relevant agreement, or any source material or special nuclear material derived from the use of any such material or
equipment.' Under the Agreement of December 28, 1957, with
Italy, the parties also pledged that not only materials and equipment but information as well would be used solely for peaceful
purposes. However, there is nothing in the agreement to indicate
how the parties expected to give effect to this provision.9
In line with the over-all objective of "nondiversion," the recipient
party also guarantees the "nontransfer" of certain designated
materials to unauthorized persons or beyond its own jurisdiction,
except with the prior consent in writing of the United Kingdom.'"
Like the guarantee of nondiversion, the nontransfer pledge covers
not only materials or equipment obtained pursuant to the agreement but also source materials derived from the use of any such
material or equipment." Furthermore, it also covers any portion
of the excess special nuclear materials that the recipient government
did not wish to use and with respect to which the United Kingdom
did not exercise its purchasing priority. Such materials could be
transferred to a third country or to an international organization
only with the consent of the United Kingdom if they were intended
for peaceful purposes.' 2
7 For example, Agreements with: Belgium, Nov. 18, 1955,
222 U.N.T.S.
328, art. VII(3); Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VII(c) (ii);
Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VI.
8 Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VIII(a);
Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VII(a). For substantially similar
provisions, compare also agreements embodied in Exchanges of Notes with:
Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246, pt. I(a); Norway, July 12,
1957,9 310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. I(a).
Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. V.
oAgreements with: Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246, pt. I(b);
Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VIII(b); Norway, July 12, 1957,
310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. 2(b); Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313 U.N.T.S. 110, art.
V(art. V(b); Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art VII(b); Sweden,
Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. VI. Compare Agreement with Germany,
July 31, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 94, art. VII(b).
I"Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VIII(b);
Spain,2 Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VH(b).
1 Agreements with:
Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VII(c)
(ii; Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VI(c) (iii).
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Under the Agreement of November 18, 1955, with Belgium, a
wartime ally, both parties have the right to insist on nontransfer
inasmuch as it is stipulated that the recipient of any materials, including equipment and devices, or of any classified information
may not disseminate further such information or transfer such materials to any other country without the consent in writing of the
party which originally provided them." It also may be noted that
the prohibition, under this Agreement, extends to the transfer of
any equipment or device which would involve disclosure of any
classified information received from the other party without the
latter's consent in writing. Thus the nontransfer relates not only to
equipment and devices supplied under the Agreement but also to
other equipment and devices if they disclose classified information
received from the other party."
The above Agreement with Belgium also prohibited Belgium
from transferring to any country other than the United Kingdom
or the United States any special nuclear material produced in
Belgium, the Belgian Congo or Ruanda Urundi unless it had received an assurance that the material would not be used for military purposes." If necessary, the Belgian Government could consult with the United Kingdom on the international significance of
the proposed transfer to any country other than the United States.'"
In harmony with the over-all objective of nondiversion, as well
as with the concomitant objective of nontransfer, the bilaterals
concluded by the United Kingdom also envisage a number of
lesser objectives, such as limited use of the materials transferred,
limitations on the quantity of materials made available, reprocessing
requirements and nonalteration. Accordingly, under the Agreement with Italy, the latter pledges that the fuel purchased pursuant
to the Agreement will be used only in the reactors obtained from
the United Kingdom, unless the latter's consent is obtained for its
use in other reactors. ' Similarly, under the Agreement of September 29, 1957, with Sweden, the latter pledges that the designated
material obtained pursuant to the Agreement or derived from the
IINov. 18, 1955, 222 U.N.T.S. 328 art IX(3).
4Ibid. See also Agreement with the United States, June 15, 1955, 6
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2709, art. IX.C.
-' Nov. 18, 1955, 22 U.N.T.S. 328, art. VII(3).
,6Ibid.
17 Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. IV(2) (a); see also Agreement
with Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. 111(2) (a).
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use of such material will be employed solely in a research or development program exclusively devoted to the purpose of the Agreement and that no part of it may be diverted to any other use without the United Kingdom's prior consent in writing. 8
In regard to quantity, the Agreement with Italy stipulates that
the quantity of fuel at any given time may not exceed that needed
for the full loading of any reactor or reactors together with such
additional quantity for replacement as may be necessary for the
efficient and continuous operation of the reactor. 9 With respect to
reprocessing, an area where the danger of diversion is particularly
great, most United Kingdom bilaterals provide that when any fuel
has been discharged from a reactor after irradiation or has been
discarded, or when any source material, obtained from the United
Kingdom and irradiated in any reactor employing any part of such
fuel, requires processing, it is to be delivered to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority or to processing facilities approved
by the Authority.2" Finally, the recipient country also pledges that
the form or content of the fuel or source material will not be altered after its removal from a reactor and before its delivery to the
Authority except as otherwise agreed upon."
SAFEGUADS PRocaUmS

The United Kingdom bilateral agreements involving appreciable
nuclear assistance to foreign countries, much as their American
and Canadian counterparts, set forth certain safeguards procedures
which aim to give reasonable assurance that the assistance provided
will not be diverted from peaceful to military uses. Only the United
18 Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. V(a); see also Agreements with:
Germany, July 31, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 94, art. VI; Norway, July 12, 1957,

310 U.N.T.S.
42, pt. 1(a).
' 9 Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. IV(2) (b).
20

Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. IV(2)

(c); Belgium, Nov. 18, 1955, 222 U.N.T.S. 328, art. VII(1) (b); Germany,

July 31, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 94, art. VI(b); Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313
U.N.T.S. 110, art. IV(a). Under art. 1 of the Agreement of June 5, 1963, 14
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1024, amending earlier agreement, with the United States,
irradiated special nuclear material of United States origin may be transferred
to the United Kingdom for chemical reprocessing under such terms and
conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties.
21 Agreements with: Belgium, Nov. 18i 1955, 222 U.N.T.S. 328, art.
VII(I) (b); Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246, pt. I(c); Germany,
July 31, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 94, art. IV(b); Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S.
358, art. IV(2)(d); Norway, July 12, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. I(c);
Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313 U.N.T.S. 110, art. IV(b);

Spain, Jan. 19,

1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. 111(2) (d); Sweden, Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S.
50, art. V(c).
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Kingdom Agreements with the United States and Belgium, respectively-which grew out of the wartime alliance of these countriescontain no such provisions."
Under the relevant safeguards stipulations the country supplying nuclear aid is accorded a number of rights which are regarded
as vital if foreign supervision is to be meaningful.23 The safeguards
rights are exercised by United Kingdom representatives at home
or abroad, depending on the nature of the particular safeguards
function to be performed. Thus, for instance, on-site inspection,
by its very nature, must be carried out on the territory of the
foreign country receiving assistance, whereas most of the recordkeeping and verifying activities normally are performed on home
grounds by the designated personnel of the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority.
For the exercise of effective supervision, the control organ must
be in a position to calculate the amounts of fissionable materials
produced in a reactor. To do this with some measure of accuracy
the control body must have an exact knowledge of the basic technical characteristics of the plant receiving nuclear assistance, although
not necessarily a knowledge of the manufacturing secrets and processes of the parts and equipment used in the enterprise. In recognition of this necessity the bilaterals-on the one hand-empower the
United Kingdom to examine the design of equipment and facilities which it supplies or in which any supplied material or any
special nuclear material derived from the use of such material
or equipment is to be used or processed; on the other hand, they
stress that the review and subsequent approval pertains only to
the question of insuring that the design is for civil purposes and
permits the effective application of safeguards."
Another essential prerequisite of an effective safeguards system
is the maintenance by the authorities concerned of an agreed
system of records to cover operations and to permit accountability
of materials and equipment subject to control. Thus the recipient
.2The only guarantee incorporated in the agreements is that all classified
infonnation and material, including equipment and devices, shall be safeguarded in accordance with the security arrangements between the parties.
See Agreements with: The United States June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
2709,2 3art. IX.A; Belgium, Nov. 18, 1955, 222 U.N.T.S. 328, art. IX.2.
Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VI(a);
Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(a).
24Agreements
with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art.
VI(a) (i); Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(a) (i).
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country is required to maintain an accurate record of the source
and special nuclear materials derived from the use of the supplied
materials or equipment," or to keep records relating to power
level of operation and burn-up of reactor fuel.26 Furthermore the
receiving nation also is required to make available such records to
the United Kingdom authorities upon request" or to report on
these subjects to them annually or at such times as may be required
in connection with the processing of irradiated fuels.28
No matter how efficient and accurate record-keeping and reporting procedures may be, in and by themselves, they normally are
not regarded as an adequate assurance against diversion to military
purposes if in view of the appreciable amount or type of nuclear
assistance such possibility does exist. It is the on-site inspection
and verification that puts teeth into the control machinery. Thus
for a greater assurance of accountability of the source and special
nuclear materials supplied, as well as of the source and special nuclear materials derived from the use of the supplied materials or
equipment and for determining compliance with the agreement,
the United Kingdom also is given the right to designate inspectors,
following consultation with the recipient government. The inspectors at all times must have access to all places and data and to
any person who by reason of his occupation deals with supplied
material or equipment. Upon request, they may be accompanied
by representatives of the receiving nation, provided that they
are thereby not delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of
their functions.2 9
Similar but less detailed provisions may be found to the effect
that United Kingdom representatives are permitted from time to
time to inspect the conditions and employment of any part of the
fuel elements supplied pursuant to the agreement and to observe
2

s Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VI(c);
Spain,26Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(c).
Agreements with: Germany, July 31, 1956, 252 U.N.T.S. 94, art. VI(d).
27
Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VI(c);
Spain,
28 Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(c).
Agreements with: Germany, July 31, 1956, 252, U.N.T.S. 94, art. VI(d);
Sweden, Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. V(d); Portugal, July 15, 1958,
313 U.N.T.S. 110, art. IV(d). See also Exchanges of Notes with: Denmark,
May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246, pt. 1(d); Norway, July 12, 1957, 310
U.N.T.S.
42, pt. with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 3(d).
29
Agreements
358, art.
VI(a)(fi); Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(a) (ii).
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the operation of any reactor employing any part of such fuel."
Normally an inspection is undertaken once or twice a year or,
in some cases not at all, especially if the danger of diversion is
thought to be minimal in view of the type of assistance provided.
As a rule, in addition to routine paperwork-such as a comparison,
evaluation and verification of reports and records (including power
charts and balance sheets )-the inspection involves physical spot
checks, sampling and weighing procedures as well as chemical
analyses which are carried out with the use of special instruments.
The danger of diversion may be particularly great at times when
the materials are not in use but are set aside temporarily or are
awaiting their return to the supplying country. For this reason
any excess of special nuclear material over what is needed for
research or in reactors must be deposited in stores designated by
the United Kingdom until such excess is required for the agreed
use by the recipient government or persons under its jurisdiction?
Similarly, any fuel obtained under the agreement, when not actually
being used for peaceful purposes, also must be held in designated
stores under adequate safety and security precautions."
Should the United Kingdom through the exercise of its safeguards rights or otherwise discover a breach of the agreement or
a failure on the part of the recipient country to carry out any of
the undertakings specified in the agreement, it has the right to call
upon the cooperating nation to take corrective steps. If such steps
are not taken within a reasonable time, upon termination of the
agreement by notification in writing, the United Kingdom is empowered to require the cancellation of contracts made in pursuance
of the accord and the return of any fuel or other special nuclear
material supplied pursuant to the agreement, subject to payment
of compensation to the party returning such fuel or other special nuclear material.33
3

Agreements with: Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313 U.N.T.S. 110, art.
IV(d); Sweden, Sept. 20, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. V(e). See also Exchanges of Notes with: Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246, pt. 1(e);
Norway, July 12, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. I(e).
31 Agreements
with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art.
VII(c)(i);
Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VI(c)(i).
32
Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. VIII(c);
Spain,33 Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. VII(c).
Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art.
VII(2) (4); Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. XIHI(1)(3).
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The interests of the recipient country are protected by the provision which requires United Kingdom representatives, subject to
their responsibilities to the United Kingdom, not to disclose any
industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their
knowledge by reason of their official duties. 4
TANSm

OF SAFEGUAs

Two types of possible transfer of control rights and obligations
are envisaged by the United Kingdom bilaterals: transfer to European regional organizations, such as Euratom and the European
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization of European Economic
Cooperations (OEEC, now OECD), or transfer to the IAEA. The
Agreement of December 28, 1957, between the United Kingdom
and Italy, which was concluded prior to the establishment of
Euratom, envisaged that, under Article 106 of the proposed Euratom
Treaty, member states of the Community would seek renegotiation
of existing agreements in the field of atomic energy with third
countries once the treaty came into force. For its part, the United
Kingdom declared that after entry into force of the treaty and
upon conclusion of an agreement for cooperation with Euratom,
it was prepared to allow the Community to assume the rights and
obligations under the bilateral with Italy, provided that in the
judgment of the United Kingdom, Euratom adequately and securely
could carry out the undertakings of the bilateral."
Under the very same accord, the parties also agreed, on the
request of either party, to consult with each other to determine in
what respects and to what extent they desired to arrange for the
controls and safeguards provided by the bilateral to be administered
by an international agency to be created or already created and of
which both parties were members.3 6 In addition, some bilaterals
34

Agreements with: Italy, Dec. 28, 1957, 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art.
VI(a)(ii); Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. V(a)(i); Portugal,
July 15, 1958, 313 U.N.T.S. 110, art. IV(d).
3305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. II. For a detailed discussion of Euratom's
control system, see Corove, The First Multinational Atomic Inspection and
Control System at Work: Euratomns Experience, 18 STAN. L. REv. 160 (1965).
36 305 U.N.T.S. 358, art. V. Compare Exchange of Note with Norway,
July 12, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. 1(4); Agreement with Sweden, Sept. 20,
1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 50, art. IV. Agreements which were concluded after the
establishment of the IAEA and the European Nuclear Energy Agency specifically name these organizations in lieu of a general reference to an international
agency. See, for instance, Agreements with: Portugal, July 15, 1958, 313
U.N.T.S. 110, art. II; Spain, Jan. 19, 1960, 404 U.N.T.S. 42, art. IV. See
also Exchange of Note with Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S. 246,

pt. I(4).
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stipulate that, if after such consultation the parties are unable to
reach agreement, either government may terminate the agreement
by giving twelve months written notice to the other. In the event
of such termination, all source and special nuclear material received pursuant to the agreement which are in the possession of
the recipient government or any person under its jurisdiction must
be returned to the supplying party.3"
CONCLUSION

The preceding survey of the safeguards system established by
the United Kingdom under its bilateral transactions with other nations for civil purposes reveals the great concern of an atomically
advanced nation for insuring that its assistance will not be diverted
to military use. The various types of safeguards, including those
relating to the examination of design, record-keeping and reporting procedures, as well as on-site inspection, were intended to accomplish this objective. While no control system can ever be expected to be foolproof, not even with an inspector at every corner,
if properly set up it may provide a reasonable measure of assurance for nondiversion.
The main contribution of the United Kingdom bilateral control
system, much as that of its United States and Canadian counterparts, lies in the fact that it has provided an invaluable proving
ground for the practical operation and evaluation on foreign soil
of certain safeguard procedures and techniques which were beforehand tested solely on domestic grounds. At the same time, the
experience gained from the control system not only has helped the
recipient nations in the development of their internal safeguards
techniques but also has paved the way for the development of
international and regional safeguards systems.
While the envisaged transfer of the United Kingdom safeguards
responsibilities for many years did not materialize due to adverse
political climate and preference by many nations for the bilateral
controls, in the wake of a more determined United States policy of
requiring countries receiving United States atomic assistance to
accept inspection by the IAEA, the latter now seems largely to have
overcome its initial inertia. It recently has been reported that in
3 See Exchanges of Notes with: Denmark, May 20, 1960, 374 U.N.T.S.
246, pt. 1(6); Norway, July 12, 1957, 310 U.N.T.S. 42, pt. 1(6).
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line with the actual transfer of safeguards responsibilities to the
IAEA under some thirteen United States bilateral accords, the
Agency also is taking over control functions previously exercised
by the United Kingdom under its programs.38 Whether or not
such transfers ultimately will mean the complete disappearance of
the bilateral safeguards systems is difficult to predict with certainty.
While many signs point in that direction, it is possible that for
some years to come a number of countries will continue to oppose
such transfers. Should, however, these nations change their minds
and should, at the same time, the Soviet Union drop its general
opposition to international atomic inspection on its soil, such developments, may well lead to a world-wide application of the
IAEA safeguards, and thus may constitute some advance, however
small, on the hard road toward atomic arms control. Such a goal
has prompted for the lack of a better alternative-the setting up of
the bilateral inspection machineries for the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.

36 Statement by United States representative Glenn T. Seaborg made
before the General Conference of the IAEA at Tokyo on September 22,
1965, 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 677, 679 (1965).
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